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Abstract
We test the existence of possible gender biases affecting
firm behavior in demanding and obtaining bank credit
using a cross‐country sample of European small‐ and
medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs). We show consistent
evidence that female‐led firms are more likely than their
male counterparts to refrain from applying for loans.
When they apply, female‐led enterprises do not seem to
face gender discrimination from the lender. Interest-
ingly, however, signs of gender bias appear to arise
during the upside phase of the economy. Overall, our
study provides support for policy actions aimed at
reducing the frictions faced by women‐led SMEs when
accessing credit markets.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) heavily rely on banks to finance their projects
as they find it difficult to raise funds via capital markets (Caglayan & Xu, 2016; Cingano,
Manaresi, & Sette, 2016). The conditions faced by SMEs when accessing bank credit are thus
crucial for their existence and development (Degryse, Matthews, & Zhao, 2018; Ferrando,
Popov, & Udell, 2017; Vermoesen, Deloof, & Laveren, 2013). Specific issues concern the impact
that such conditions may have on businesses led by women managers. If we look at the
worldwide data on the gender gap in 2018 (Global Gender Gap Index), significant gender
inequalities, especially in economic participation and political empowerment, emerge even
across European countries. This is not inconsequential, as gender differences may also affect the
bank–firm relationship. Indeed, several studies demonstrate that problems with access to
finance represent a major impediment to women successfully managing their businesses
(see, for example, Marlow & Patton, 2005; World Bank, 2011).
The literature highlights the existence of issues faced by women‐led firms, when accessing
finance, from both the demand and the supply sides of the channel. More specifically, from the
demand side there is a discrete branch of the literature highlighting that women‐led enterprises
tend to refrain from applying for bank credit because they generally feel less confident than
men about their bargaining abilities when dealing with lenders. Hence, they are more likely not
to apply, thus behaving as discouraged borrowers (Bardasi, Sabarwal, & Terrell, 2011; Freel,
Carter, Tagg, & Mason, 2012; Moro, Wisniewski, & Mantovani, 2017; Ongena & Popov, 2016).
Other scholars have also pointed that female‐led businesses may be more likely to refrain from
applying for external funds (e.g. equity capital) as they prefer to finance their projects via
internal sources (Carter, Shaw, Wing, & Wilson, 2007; Coleman & Robb, 2009; Mukhtar, 2006),
thus limiting their growth opportunities, or by relying on networks of friends and family (see,
for example, Alesina, Lotti, & Mistrulli, 2013; Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2004; Lim & Suh,
2019; Sena, Scott, & Roper, 2012). With regard to the supply side, on the other hand, a typical
issue that female‐led firms may face, compared to male‐led enterprises, is a higher rate of
rejection of their loan applications (see, for example, Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo, & Wolken, 2002).
Additionally, women‐led businesses may experience a partial rejection from the lender
(Kremel & Yazdanfar, 2015; Treichel‐Zimmerman & Scott, 2006), or may even face higher price
conditions or be required to provide higher collateral than men in order to obtain credit
(Alesina et al., 2013; Bellucci, Borisov, & Zazzaro, 2010; Mascia & Rossi, 2017; Muravyev,
Talavera, & Schäfer, 2009; Wu & Chua, 2012). It is also worth mentioning that the literature on
this issue is not conclusive and that several studies have not detected signs of gender‐based
discrimination (see, for example, Carter et al., 2007; Moro et al., 2017).
In this paper we build on the above literature to comprehensively investigate whether and in
what way female‐led companies are likely to be discriminated against, compared to men, when
they apply for bank loans, as well as whether and why they avoid applying for bank loans to
finance their projects.
Various reasons motivate our study. First, although the topic appears to be widely debated,
even recent papers (such as Bui, Nguyen, Pham, & Phung, 2019) underscore the need for more
empirical investigations, in response to the numerous qualitative and theoretical works, on the
potential gender gap faced by the SMEs when accessing finance. Second, as recently highlighted
by Rostamkalaei, Nitani, and Riding (2018), most papers still provide mixed evidence on the
existence of gender issues in access to finance, which motivates us to further investigate the
topic. Third, the vast majority of existing studies tend to focus on single issues, rather than
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jointly considering a range of reasons, arising from the demand or the supply side of the bank
lending market. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that most scholars in the field have
investigated the issue of borrower discouragement to apply for bank loans, and loan rejection
perpetrated by the lenders (see, for example, Cowling, Marlow, & Liu, 2019; Moro et al., 2017;
Presbitero, Rabellotti, & Piras, 2014). What is missing, though, to the best of our knowledge, is a
study that jointly assesses a variety of motivations (from the borrowers’ perspective) not to
apply for loans, as well as a range of adverse outcomes (of applications for bank lending)
experienced by the SMEs.
By relying on the wealth of information provided by the Survey on the Access to Finance of
Enterprises (SAFE) confidentially released by the European Central Bank (ECB), our study
offers the following contributions. First, we extend the literature on gender gap issues in access
to finance by concurrently considering (with an appropriate methodology) a variety of self‐
restraint motives of the firms, as well as a number of adverse outcomes arising from
applications for external finance. Notably, with regard to the former, in addition to the
discouragement motivation, we investigate whether female‐led SMEs tend, more than men, not
to apply for bank loans because of sufficient funds or for other reasons. When we turn to the
results of the loan applications, not only do we consider the actual rejection by the lender, but
also we investigate whether female‐led firms are more likely than men to be partially rejected or
to refuse the loan because the price conditions are too costly. Overall, to do so we employ
multinomial logistic models that allow simultaneous and efficient estimates to predict the
probabilities of alternative outcomes of a categorically distributed dependent variable. In our
study, these are represented by the reasons for non‐application, on the demand side, and by the
results of the applications, on the supply side. Furthermore, because the choice to appoint a
female leader as head of a company might not fully be exogenous (Adams & Ferreira, 2009;
Mascia & Rossi, 2017; Sila, Gonzalez, & Hagendorff, 2016), we address possible endogeneity
affecting our estimates through the use of a two‐step instrumental variable technique, in a
similar fashion to Cumming (2008) and Heger and Tykvová (2009).
Second, we exploit the macroeconomic heterogeneity characterizing our data to detect whether
possible disparities between female and male firms arise during different phases of the economic
cycle. Negative macroeconomic scenarios, by affecting banks, translate into lower lending quantity
or higher cost of credit for SMEs (Cole & Sokolyk, 2016; Degryse et al., 2018). Therefore, the
perception of such issues might significantly impact on the firm's behavior leading, for instance, to
discouragement conduct (Mac an Bhaird, Vidal, & Lucey, 2016). Interestingly, recent studies on
access to finance have limited their analysis to the post‐global financial crisis period in a specific
country only (Cowling et al., 2019), or have exploited the country heterogeneity characterizing
their data regardless of the time‐specific macroeconomic conditions (Mascia & Rossi, 2017). To the
best of our knowledge, we are thus the first to explore whether differences in macroeconomic
conditions affect the self‐restraint behavior of women‐led firms, as well as the outcomes of their
bank loan applications, focusing on opposite dynamics of the business cycle occurring during and
after a particular turbulent period across our sampled countries.
Our findings reveal that female‐led firms are more likely than male‐led ones to be financially
constrained since they behave as discouraged borrowers. Moreover, they also tend to refrain
from taking out loans as they rely, more than men‐led businesses, on internal funding. Results
are robust to various model specifications and are corroborated after addressing endogeneity. In
addition, female discouragement persists in both phases of the business cycle, whereas non‐
applications for sufficient funds and other reasons—by female‐led SMEs—mainly occur during
economic downturns. As regards the supply, signs of discrimination perpetrated by the lender
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against women arise only during the upside phase of the business cycle. Finally, our results
highlight that, during economic downturns, female‐led businesses are less likely, than men, to
refuse a loan offer even if it is too costly.
The remainder of paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we offer a review of the
literature and define the research hypotheses. In Section 3 we describe the data and the
methodology. In Section 4 we discuss the empirical results and provide additional analyses.
Section 5 concludes.
2 | LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH
HYPOTHESES
There is a wide literature in the field of entrepreneurship that investigates whether the manager's
gender is a major factor affecting firms’ inclination to access bank credit, as well as whether lenders
behave differently when providing loans to male and female borrowers. Most of these papers,
however, provide mixed evidence on the existence of gender issues in access to finance
(Rostamkalaei et al., 2018), and are usually focused on single concerns (such as borrower
discouragement to apply for bank loans, and loan rejection perpetrated by the lenders) or
investigate the behavior of SMEs chartered in specific countries (see, for example, Cowling et al.,
2019; Presbitero et al., 2014). Hence, more comprehensive and more conclusive studies on the
problems faced by SMEs when accessing bank lending are still needed by policy‐makers, especially
because of the acknowledged importance of small businesses for the real economy in Europe.
Our setup enables us to investigate various issues potentially affecting SMEs’ access to bank
finance. Therefore, in developing our testable hypotheses, we will survey two branches of the
literature: one that highlights gender‐based disparities arising from the demand side, and one
that attributes the existence of gender gap issues to supply‐driven factors.
2.1 | Demand‐side predictions
On the demand side there is some consensus around the view that women‐led enterprises may
tend to refrain from applying for bank credit, as their general inclination to be less confident
and more risk‐averse than men could lead them to be more skeptical about their ability to
successfully obtain funding (see, for example, Carter, Mwaura, Ram, Trehan, & Jones, 2015;
Chaudhuri, Sasidharan, & Raj, 2018; Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Malmström, Johansson, &
Wincent, 2017; Ongena & Popov, 2016; Poczter & Shapsis, 2018; Roper & Scott, 2009; Treichel‐
Zimmerman & Scott, 2006). Because of differences between men's and women's characteristics,
skills or preferences, female firms could thus behave as discouraged borrowers (Freel et al.,
2012; Kalnins & Williams, 2014; Kon & Storey, 2003; Moro et al., 2017). We therefore propose to
test the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. Female‐led firms face a higher probability of not applying for bank loans
than their male counterparts because they behave as discouraged borrowers (i.e. they refrain
from applying for fear of rejection).
The literature also argues that non‐applications for bank loans can be due to a different
attitude of women‐led firms, which may prefer to resort to internal rather than external funds
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(see, for example, Carter et al., 2007; Coleman & Robb, 2009; Fairlie & Robb, 2009; Mukhtar,
2006; Orser, Riding, & Manley, 2006; Sena et al., 2012) or to friends and family networks (see,
for example, Alesina et al., 2013; Charness & Gneezy, 2012; Guiso et al., 2004; Kwong, Jones‐
Evans, & Thompson, 2012; Lim & Suh, 2019; Manolova, Carter, Manev, & Gyoshev, 2007; Sena
et al., 2012; Watson & McNaughton, 2007). Relying on internal funds is viewed as a form of
financial constraint (on this point, see Fazzari, Hubbard, Petersen, Blinder, & Poterba, 1988;
Guariglia & Liu, 2014; Sasidharan, Lukose, & Komera, 2015) which, in turn, may affect the
firm's growth. Indeed, choosing to resort to internal or external finance is not inconsequential,
as debt financing—compared to internal finance—is supposed to generate, via the leverage
effect, a more than proportional impact on growth (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002). However,
female‐led companies are usually less eager than their male peers to expand their business—an
attitude that essentially mirrors their higher risk aversion (Alsos, Isaksen, & Ljunggren, 2006;
Carter et al., 2015) which could justify their greater reliance on internal funds. In this regard, it
is worth noting that, following the pecking order theory (Myers & Majluf, 1984), female‐led
SMEs might exhibit a stronger preference for internal rather than external sources of finance
(Watson, 2006) potentially because of their higher need to be in control of most aspects of their
business (Mukhtar, 2002). Another argument supporting this view relates to the information
asymmetries in capital markets—between firms and potential providers of funds—that
determine a wedge between the cost of internal and external finance, which is even more
pronounced for SMEs (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002). Such evidence—coupled with the potential
perception of women as differently treated by lenders—might then lead female managers to
build up, over time, their own cushion of internal finances that could eventually lead them to be
independent from banks. Ultimately, we cannot rule out the possibility that firms could also
decide to avoid engaging with banks for other unknown reasons. All in all, this brings us to test
the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. Female‐led firms face a higher probability of not applying for bank loans
than their male counterparts, because they have sufficient funds or have other reasons for
doing so.
2.2 | Supply‐side predictions
As regards the issue of gender discrimination from the supply side, it is worth mentioning that
the literature identifies two different types of discrimination, namely taste‐based or prejudicial
discrimination (driven by preferences and beliefs that are not based on objective criteria) and
the statistical discrimination (occurring when the collection of information on the firm's
creditworthiness is difficult and costly). In these situations, one thus easily infers the necessary
information by observing obvious features, such as gender (see, for example, Aristei & Gallo,
2016; Bellucci et al., 2010; Mascia & Rossi, 2017).
Several studies suggest that the credit requirements imposed by banks are more likely to favor
male rather than female‐led firms, mainly because lenders have different perceptions about the
entrepreneurs’ potential (Alsos & Ljunggren, 2017; Carter et al., 2007; Marlow & Patton, 2005).
Compared to male‐led enterprises, female‐led firms may indeed face a higher rate of rejection of
their loan applications (Cavalluzzo et al., 2002), partial rejection by the lender (Kremel &
Yazdanfar, 2015; Treichel‐Zimmerman & Scott, 2006), higher price conditions, or be required to
provide higher collateral for the credit supplied (Alesina et al., 2013; Bellucci et al., 2010;
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Mascia & Rossi, 2017; Muravyev et al., 2009; Wu & Chua, 2012). It is worth noting, however, that
this evidence is far from conclusive. Indeed, several other studies do not find signs of gender‐
based discrimination, as they show that women's constraints in access to credit are mostly due to
structural features of the firm, such as size, activity sector, the manager's level of education and
experience, and the inability or reluctance to provide suitable collateral or personal guarantees
(see, for example, Blanchflower, Levine, & Zimmerman, 2003; Carter et al., 2007; Cavalluzzo &
Cavalluzzo, 1998; Coleman, 2002; Moro et al., 2017).
We therefore try to shed light on the potential discrimination motives arising from the
supply side by testing the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 3. Female‐led firms face a higher probability of being credit constrained,
than their male counterparts because they are rejected by the lender, or they decide to refuse
the loan as it is too costly.
Hypothesis 4. Female‐led firms face a higher probability of being credit constrained,
than their male counterparts because they receive only part of the amount requested.
3 | DATA, MODEL, AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 | Data
We carry out our analysis by relying on firm‐level data retrieved from the SAFE, which is jointly
run by the ECB and the European Commission (EC). The SAFE is a harmonized and
homogeneous data set providing qualitative information on enterprises’ financial needs, their
experience of access to finance, as well as a series of firm‐level and financial characteristics
provided on the basis of self‐assessed perceptions.1 Each survey round (or so‐called wave) of the
SAFE is addressed to a randomly selected sample of nonfinancial SMEs included in the Dun &
Bradstreet business register.
Although the SAFE does not provide balance sheet data, it has a number of relevant
advantages. First, it allows us to trace over time firms’ decisions to either access credit or to
refrain. It provides qualitative information based on firms’ perceptions concerning their
experience of accessing credit, and distinguishes the different motives behind firms’ decisions
about financing. In addition, data are available for a large sample of European SMEs, allowing
us to take into account cross‐country heterogeneity. Specifically, our analysis covers the 11
largest euro‐area economies (Austria, Belgium, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain), as they are the countries whose firms have been
systematically surveyed, every round, since 2009.
The SAFE also offers information about the gender of the owner, director, or chief executive
officer (CEO) of the firms surveyed. This information is available only from the second to the
tenth wave of the survey (the period from July 2009 to March 2014). Therefore, we end up with
a sample of 60,058 observations, collected from those nine waves. Specifically, 20,150
observations are from micro‐enterprises, 20,245 from small firms, 15,284 from medium‐size
businesses, and the remaining 4,379 observations refer to a sample of large firms which serves
1Because of the anonymity characterizing the survey, we are not able to link quantitative balance sheet information related to the enterprises in our data set.
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as control group. In Tables S1 and S2 provided in the Supporting Information available online,
we offer a snapshot of the sample observations by country and gender and by country and wave,
respectively.
3.2 | Model, variables, and methodology
Considering the research hypotheses outlined in Section 2, our model estimates the probability
of observing the possible outcomes of our dependent variables as follows:
Y f Female, firm characteristics, structural and cyclic macro, country, waveP ( ) = ( )i (1)
where Y is one of the two dependent variables that we employ in our analysis, Female is our key
regressor, the vector firm characteristics controls for the firm's features, structural and cyclic
macro is a vector of country‐level controls, and country and wave are vectors of country and
time dummies, respectively.
3.2.1 | Dependent variables
For the purpose of our analysis, we select two questions from the SAFE, namely q7a_a and q7b_a.
Question q7a_a inquires about the firms’ choices in the application to bank credit and asks:
[With regard to bank loans], could you please indicate whether you: (1) applied for
them over the past 6 months; (2) did not apply because you thought you would be
rejected; (3) did not apply because you had sufficient internal funds; (4) or did not
apply for other reasons?
The numbers in parentheses denote the way each interviewee's answers were coded. Hence,
we employ such information to generate our first dependent variable which we call Applying for
bank loans.
Question q7b_a is addressed only to the firms that applied for bank loans and inquires about
the outcomes of the applications as follows:
If you applied and tried to negotiate for [bank loans] over the past 6 months, did you:
(1) receive all the financing you requested; (2) receive only part of the financing you
requested; (3) refuse to proceed because of unacceptable costs or terms and conditions;
(4) or have you not received anything at all?
Again, the numbers in parentheses denote the way each interviewee's answers were coded.
We employ this information to generate our second dependent variable, which we identify as
Obtaining bank loans.2
2In Table S3 in the online Supporting Information we provide a breakdown of the sample observations for both dependent variables.
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3.2.2 | Regressors
The key variable of our investigation is Female, which is a dummy that equals 1 if the owner/
director/CEO of the enterprise is female, and 0 otherwise. It is worth noting that the
information provided by the SAFE does not allow us to distinguish among the three roles
(owner, director, and CEO). We acknowledge that the lack of such detail is not negligible.
However, it is not crucial in our investigation, as the firms in our sample are mainly micro and
small. Therefore, we assume that, in most cases, the firm's owner is also the firm's manager (i.e.
manager corresponds to owner‐manager).3
Firm characteristics is a vector that includes both standard firm features (i.e. age, sector, size)
and financial indicators, such as the perceived variations in capital, profitability and credit
history of the enterprises surveyed. Specifically, to control for the firm's age we utilize the
following three dummies; Very recent, equal to 1 if the firm is less than 2 years old; Recent, equal
to 1 if the firm is between 2 and 5 years old; and Old, equal to 1 if the firm is between 5 and
10 years old.
In addition, we include industry fixed effects to control for the firm's activity sector: we
employ the dummies Construction, Manufacturing, Wholesale/retail, equal to 1 if the firm
belongs to the construction, manufacturing, and wholesale and retail trade sector, respectively.
Then, to control for the size of the firms surveyed, we utilize three other dummies: Micro, equal
to 1 if the firm has between 1 and 9 employees; Small, equal to 1 if the firm has between 10 and
49 employees; and Medium, equal to 1 if the firm has between 50 and 249 employees.
With regard to financial controls, we capture the perceived variations in a firm's capital via
the dummies Capital up and Capital down. Notably, Capital up (down) takes the value 1 if the
firm declares that its own capital has increased (decreased) over the past 6 months, and 0
otherwise. Similarly, we control for changes in profitability via the dummies Profit up (down),
equal to 1 if a firm experienced an increase (decrease) in its profits during the previous
6 months, and 0 otherwise. Moreover, we keep track of the declared variations in the firm credit
history by generating Creditworthiness up (down), equal to 1 when an enterprise perceives an
increase (decrease) of its creditworthiness over the past 6 months, and 0 otherwise. It is worth
noting that all these dummies are not capturing the level of capital, profitability, and
creditworthiness. Rather, they offer information about the firm's perception of the change
experienced in each of the above‐mentioned measures. We expect that firms exhibiting positive
variations in creditworthiness and profitability may be more likely to obtain a bank loan.
Finally, we account for the change in the need for loans by including the dummies Demand up
(down), equal to 1 when a firm declares that its need for bank credit has increased (decreased)
over the past 6 months, and 0 otherwise. Overall, the inclusion of all these variables is aimed at
limiting potential biases arising from our estimates, as well as to alleviate concerns that possible
gender effects are driven by omitted variables rather than being signs of discrimination.
The structural and cyclic macro vector includes the growth of credit, the Index of Economic
Freedom, the Herfindahl index of bank concentration, the rate of unemployment, and a dummy
accounting for the expansionary monetary policies. Notably, we account for the availability of
credit in the economy by including the annual growth rate of bank loans provided to
nonfinancial corporations, which we retrieve from the ECB Data Warehouse. In particular,
because the SAFE is run with biannual frequency, for the growth of credit we employ averages
3To corroborate this assumption, we have checked whether the findings from our analyses change when we run our estimates on a subsample consisting of
single‐owner businesses only. The results (not reported) appear to be consistent.
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of quarterly data for each wave of the survey (similarly to Ferrando et al., 2017). We expect that,
during periods characterized by positive growth of credit, firms will be less likely to refrain from
applying for credit as well as to face a negative outcome from their loan applications. Moreover,
we utilize the Index of Economic Freedom to account for the impact of the legal‐institutional
environment on the functioning of the credit market. We expect that the higher the level of
economic freedom, the easier and less costly the financial transactions will be. Additionally, we
control for the structure of the banking market, in each country, via the Herfindahl index of
total assets’ concentration that we collected from the ECB Data Warehouse. Furthermore, we
account for the fluctuations in the business cycle by utilizing the rate of unemployment
retrieved from Eurostat, which we compute as averages of quarterly data for each survey round.
Overall, we expect that during a slowdown of the cycle, characterized by lower rates of
employment, firms tend to suffer more when accessing credit markets, ceteris paribus. Finally,
we keep track of a period of expansionary monetary policy that followed the announcement of
the Outright Monetary Transactions program in 2012 by employing a specific dummy, OMT.
We suppose that firms can more easily access bank credit during periods characterized by high
volumes of money in circulation. Table 1 shows the summary statistics related to the variables
included in our specifications, while descriptions and sources of variables are provided in
Table A1 in the Appendix. The matrix reporting pairwise correlations between the regressors is
available in Table S4 in the online Supporting Information.
3.2.3 | Methodology
To estimate model (1), we use multinomial logistic regressions. This method is suitable
when the dependent variable is qualitative and has more than two outcome categories with
no natural ordering. Indeed, in a multinomial logistic setting, binary logistic regressions are
simultaneously run for comparison among the various outcome categories, which permits
efficient analysis of the estimates as opposed to multiple independent logit models. The use
of both qualitative and quantitative regressors is admitted with such a technique that
employs maximum likelihood to assess the regression's function. Additionally, our
empirical setup includes calibrated weights to adjust the sample to be representative of
the population from which it is extracted (as in Ferrando et al., 2017). Furthermore, we
correct standard errors to address heteroskedasticity and we cluster them at the country
level in order to remove potential bias affecting the estimates. Finally, we carry out all our
tests by including either country and time dummies separately or, alternatively, country ×
time dummies (while dropping our country‐level regressors) in order to control for
unobserved time‐varying country characteristics.
3.3 | Endogeneity
There is a discrete consensus in the literature around the view that the gender of a firm's leader
might not be exogenous (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Mascia & Rossi, 2017; Sila et al., 2016). Thus,
any potential correlation between the leader's gender and the outcomes of our dependent
variables accounting for bank loan (non‐)applications and results may be spurious. Specifically,
omitted‐firm characteristics can be source of endogeneity. Indeed, unobservable factors, such as
corporate culture, may guide the choice regarding the gender of the firm leadership.
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TABLE 1 Summary statistics
This table reports summary statistics of the variables employed in our analyses. Applying for bank loans is a variable
equal to 1, 2, 3, or 4 if a firm applied, did not apply because of possible rejection, did not apply because of sufficient
internal funds, or did not apply for other reasons during the past 6 months, respectively. Obtaining bank loans is a
variable equal to 1, 2, 3, or 4 if a firm applied and got everything, applied but only got part of the loan, applied but
refused because the cost was too high, or applied but was rejected during the past 6 months, respectively. Female is a
dummy equal to 1 if the firm's owner/director/CEO is female, and 0 otherwise. Profit up is a dummy variable equal to 1
if a firm experienced an increase in net income after taxes in the past 6 months. Profit down is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if a firm experienced a decrease in net income after taxes in the past 6 months. Creditworthiness up is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the firm's credit history improved in the past 6 months. Creditworthiness down is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the firm's credit history worsened in the past 6 months. Capital up is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm's
own capital increased in the past 6 months. Capital down is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm's own capital
decreased in the past 6 months. Demand up is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm's need for bank loans increased in
the past 6 months. Demand down is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm's need for bank loans decreased in the past 6
months. Micro is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has between 1 and 9 employees. Small is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the firm has between 10 and 49 employees.Medium is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has between
50 and 249 employees. Very recent is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is less than 2 years old. Recent is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the firm is between 2 and 5 years old. Old is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is between 5
and 10 years old. Construction is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's main activity is construction. Manufacturing
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's main activity is manufacturing. Wholesale/retail is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if the firm's main activity is wholesale or retail trade. Credit growth is the annual growth rate of loans provided by
credit institutions to nonfinancial corporations based on averages of quarterly data for each survey round. Economic
freedom is an aggregate measure of a country's overall economic freedom. Unemployment rate is the annual
unemployment rate based on averages of quarterly data for each survey round. Concentration is the Herfindahl index of
total assets concentration (for the banking sector). OMT is a dummy variable equal to 1 from the year of announcement
(2012) of the Outright Monetary Transactions program.
Observations Mean Median St. Dev. p1 p99
Dependent variables
Applying for bank loans 60,058 2.625 3.000 1.085 1.000 4.000
Obtaining bank loans 14,866 1.591 1.000 0.994 1.000 4.000
Key regressor
Female 60,058 0.125 0.000 0.331 0.000 1.000
Firm‐level controls
Profit up 60,058 0.246 0.000 0.431 0.000 1.000
Profit down 60,058 0.466 0.000 0.499 0.000 1.000
Creditworthiness up 60,058 0.213 0.000 0.409 0.000 1.000
Creditworthiness down 60,058 0.141 0.000 0.348 0.000 1.000
Capital up 60,058 0.253 0.000 0.434 0.000 1.000
Capital down 60,058 0.203 0.000 0.403 0.000 1.000
Demand up 60,058 0.190 0.000 0.392 0.000 1.000
Demand down 60,058 0.135 0.000 0.341 0.000 1.000
Micro 60,058 0.336 0.000 0.472 0.000 1.000
Small 60,058 0.337 0.000 0.473 0.000 1.000
Medium 60,058 0.254 0.000 0.436 0.000 1.000
Very recent 60,058 0.017 0.000 0.127 0.000 1.000
Recent 60,058 0.066 0.000 0.248 0.000 1.000
Old 60,058 0.126 0.000 0.332 0.000 1.000
Construction 60,058 0.100 0.000 0.300 0.000 1.000
Manufacturing 60,058 0.256 0.000 0.436 0.000 1.000
Wholesale/retail 60,058 0.336 0.000 0.472 0.000 1.000
(Continues)
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In order to cope with this potential endogeneity issue, we employ a two‐step approach in a
similar fashion to Cumming (2008) and Heger and Tykvová (2009). Notably, in the first step we
utilize a logit model to investigate the determinants of our Female dummy. More specifically,
for identification purposes, we need an instrument that is strongly correlated with the Female
regressor and is not correlated with the error term. We therefore identify the share of female
employment by sector of activity in each country as a proper instrument for our Female dummy
(as in Mascia & Rossi, 2017). We retrieve this instrument from Eurostat and utilize averages of
quarterly data for each wave of the survey. Hence, we regress Female on the rate of female
employment and a variety of firm and country controls from model (1). Then, in the second
stage, we estimate model (1) by employing our multinomial logistic setting where we include
the predicted values from the first step instead of using the Female dummy.
As an additional robustness check, we address the endogeneity issue by employing an
alternative instrument. Indeed, we are aware that the use of the share of female employment by
sector may present some limitations due to the fact that an industry with, say, a higher portion
of female workers might not necessarily be an industry with a corresponding share of women
entrepreneurs/managers. Therefore, to further corroborate our analysis, we instrument our
Female dummy by employing the share of female self‐employment, by sector of activity. Like
the previous instrument, this variable is available quarterly from Eurostat, and we thus link its
averages to each survey round. Finally, this variable is only available for a smaller sample,
which is also the reason why we do not employ it as the main instrument.4
4 | EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.1 | Multinomial logistic analysis
We start our empirical analysis by simultaneously testing Hypotheses 1 and 2 through the use of
our multinomial logistic setting. Notably, we estimate model (1) with the first of the two
dependent variables (i.e. Applying for bank loans). More specifically, the use of such methodology
requires us to specify a base outcome (i.e. applied) against which we compare the remaining
outcomes of the dependent variable under investigation (i.e. non‐application for fear of rejection,
for sufficient funds, for other reasons). The first four columns in Table 2 report the results of a test
carried out utilizing country and time dummies individually; the remaining four columns report
the same test when employing country × time dummies in lieu of the country‐level controls.
TABLE 1 (Continued)
Observations Mean Median St. Dev. p1 p99
Country‐level controls
Credit growth 60,058 −0.141 0.400 4.004 −10.150 8.400
Economic freedom 60,058 67.814 69.200 5.575 55.400 81.300
Unemployment rate 60,058 11.693 9.400 6.477 4.700 27.400
Concentration 60,058 0.091 0.060 0.079 0.021 0.370
OMT 60,058 0.478 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.000
Abbreviations: p1, percentile 1; p99, percentile 99.
4For the sake of clarity, this instrument is available for the manufacturing and wholesale/retail industries for all the sampled countries. As regards the
construction industry, the variable is missing for Austria, France, Ireland, and Portugal. No observations are available for the mining industry.
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Starting with column 2 of Table 2 (Hypothesis 1), we observe that the coefficient related to
Female is positive and highly significant at the 1% level, signaling that women are more likely
than men not to apply for fear of rejection. The same result is observed in column 6 where we
employ country × time dummies in lieu of the country‐level controls. This evidence
underscores that, in the euro area, women seem to behave as discouraged borrowers
anticipating a possible denial from the lender. Such a finding is consistent with theories
emphasizing the greater lack of confidence characterizing women (see, for example, Carter
et al., 2015; Moro et al., 2017).
Moving to columns 3–4 and 7–8 of Table 2, where we test Hypothesis 2, we again find that
Female is highly significant at the 1% level.5 This suggests that female‐led firms are more likely
than men‐led firms not to apply for bank loans because they have sufficient funds or for other
reasons, as opposed to the applied outcome. This evidence gives support to the idea that women
either suffer, more than men, from potential frictions characterizing the credit markets, thus
leading them to rely on internal finance (see, for example, Fazzari et al., 1988), or are less
inclined than men to exploit possible growth opportunities, thus not requesting additional
finance (Alsos et al., 2006; Carter et al., 2015; Malmström et al., 2017), or are simply more
parsimonious in the use of funds. Furthermore, the result from columns 4 and 8 would appear
to signal, for instance, that women turn to the bank‐lending channel less than men as they
perhaps prefer to rely on informal channels, such as family or other social ties (Alesina et al.,
2013).
As regards the controls employed in the model, it is worthy of note that the dummy Capital
up enters with a negative sign, suggesting that, when firms increase their capital endowment,
their probability of not applying for bank loans diminishes.6 Moving to the country‐level
controls, interestingly we observe the significance of the unemployment rate and the OMT
variable in column 2 of Table 2. Specifically, an increase in the unemployment rate leads firms
to doubt that any loan application they may make will be successful, given the negative
macroeconomic environment surrounding their enterprise, so that they eventually give up. In
contrast, during periods of expansionary monetary policy, as captured by our OMT dummy,
firms seem to regain confidence in the banking system, thus showing a reduction in their fear of
rejection.
Turning to the supply side, Table 3 shows regressions arising from model (1) when
employing our second dependent variable (i.e. Obtaining bank loans) to estimate Hypotheses 3
and 4. Here we assess the occurrence of a bias between female‐ and male‐led firms by looking at
the different forms of financial constraints perpetrated by the lender (i.e. applied and got part of
the loan requested, applied and refused because the loan was too costly, applied but was rejected)
as opposed to the base outcome (i.e. applied and got everything). The first four columns in
Table 3 report regressions results when we estimate model (1) by employing country and time
dummies separately. The remaining four columns show the results obtained when including
country × time dummies in lieu of the country‐level controls.
Overall, we find that the Female dummy is never significant across the various columns,
suggesting that there is no sign of loan officer bias against women. This result contradicts
5Unreported tests show that results from Table 2 are confirmed if we exclude from our analysis observations related to large firms.
6Results do not change appreciably if we employ three continuous variables (taking values of –1 when decreased, 0 when unchanged, and 1 when increased) to
capture the change in the levels of capital, profit, and creditworthiness, rather than using two dummies for each firm characteristic (six dummies overall) as we
are doing here.
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previous studies highlighting the opposite (see, for example, Bellucci et al., 2010; Cavalluzzo
et al., 2002).
Moving on to the firm‐level controls, in Table 3 we note that the coefficients of the dummies
Creditworthiness down and Capital down are generally positive and significant, implying that a
perceived deterioration in the firm's credit history and capital endowment are associated, as
expected, with a greater probability of receiving only part of the required funds, refusing the
loan because of its high costs, as well as facing rejection by the lender. As regards the country‐
level variables, we observe that the unemployment rate is positive and significant, suggesting
that worsening employment levels lead lenders to refuse loan applications or, at best, to provide
only part of the required credit, presumably because of the severe macroeconomic conditions.
In contrast, the negative and significant coefficients of the OMT dummy (columns 3 and 4,
Table 3) underscore that the probability of SMEs refusing the proposed loan or being denied
credit diminishes during periods of expansionary monetary policy. Additionally, some
interesting insights emerge with respect to the structural controls. First, the coefficient of the
banking market Concentration variable is negative and significant (column 4, Table 3). This
result corroborates the information hypothesis (Dell'Ariccia & Marquetz, 2006; Fungáčová,
Shamshur, & Weill, 2017), which suggests that the higher the banking market concentration,
the higher the incentive for banks to focus on relationship lending. This enables banks to
reduce information asymmetries (thanks to a greater amount of soft information collected
throughout the relationship) and favors the functioning of the credit market. Finally, the
variable accounting for a country's Economic freedom exhibits a negative and significant
coefficient in column 4, which highlights that firms are less likely to face a loan rejection in
countries characterized by greater levels of economic freedom.7
In additional analyses, which we do not report for the sake of brevity, we obtain similar
results when the demand for and supply of other sources of finance—namely, (a) trade credit,
(b) other external financing, and (c) bank overdraft, credit line or credit card overdraft—are
investigated.8 Notably, we find that female‐led SMEs are also more likely not to apply for each of
the three above‐mentioned sources of finance, compared to male‐led ones, for fear of rejection,
due to sufficient funds, and for other reasons. In contrast, and in line with the results from
Table 3, female‐led SMEs do not appear to be discriminated against when they apply for trade
credit, for other external finance, and for bank overdrafts. These findings bring novel evidence
to a branch of the literature that has traditionally investigated the attitude of firms and credit
institutions with respect to bank loan demand and supply, and seem to suggest that self‐
restraint is intrinsically rooted in women's behavior.
4.2 | Robustness check: interaction terms
A concern that may arise from our investigation is that the self‐restraint behavior of women is
guided by deteriorations in firms’ performance, rather than being a sign of potential gender
bias. To address the issue, we re‐estimate an alternative version of Equation (1)) where we
7In unreported analyses, we find that our results do not change when we employ an alternative measure of economic freedom, the Economic Freedom of the
World index provided by the Fraser Institute.
8The SAFE also investigates (via questions q7a_b, q7a_c, and q7a_d, respectively) the reasons that led enterprises not to apply for trade credit, other external
financing, and bank overdrafts (the latter being available only from the third wave of the survey). Furthermore, limited to the enterprises that applied for one of
the above‐mentioned sources of finance, the SAFE also enquires about the outcome of their applications via questions q7b_b, q7b_c, and q7b_d.
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include an interaction term between our Female dummy and a measure of the change in firms’
performance. Specifically, because the SAFE is not linked to the enterprises’ balance sheet data,
we capture variations in performance by utilizing the declared increase in the firm's profits
(Profit up). If our hypothesis is corroborated, we should yet find a positive coefficient for Female
even when firms exhibit better performance. Table 4 displays the results of such a test.
Although the interaction term is never significant, we observe that Female always remains
positive and statistically significant in all columns except those related to non‐application for
other reasons. This suggests that women‐led firms are more likely than men‐led ones not to
apply for credit because they are discouraged or because they have sufficient funds, and this
result does not appear to be driven by the economic conditions of the enterprise.9
Overall, the message we get from this test is that female‐led SMEs appear to unconditionally
refrain from applying for bank loans for fear of rejection or because they have enough funds,
even if their businesses are profitable. This is unfortunate, considering that past performance
may serve as a signal to banks of the viability of the firm (Eddleston, Ladge, Mitteness, &
Balachandra, 2016) and hence improve the chances of success with a loan application. This
result particularly highlights that policy‐makers should act in order to mitigate the concerns
faced by female‐led SMEs—especially when they behave as discouraged—and help them gain
confidence in their abilities in successfully running and growing their businesses.
4.3 | Addressing endogeneity
As pointed out in Section 3.3, the choice of hiring a female leader at the head of an enterprise
might not be completely exogenous. To cope with such a concern, we employ a two‐step
approach following Cumming (2008) and Heger and Tykvová (2009). As widely described
earlier, we use the biannual share of female employment by sector of activity as an instrument
for our Female dummy. However, because the SAFE does not provide information about the
main activity carried out by large firms (thus implying that we are not able to link their
observations with our instrument), we are forced to carry out our endogeneity checks on the
sample formed by SMEs only. Therefore, our sample size decreases by about 7% to 55,679
observations.10
In Table 5 we report the estimates of the first logistic step, where we find that the instrument
has a highly significant (at the 1% level) positive impact on the probability of female leadership.
This significant result is an essential condition for going forward with our investigation and
thus carrying out the second step of our methodology. Therefore, in Tables 6 and 7 we report
the estimates of the second stage of our two‐step approach, where we estimate model (1) via a
multinomial logistic model that utilizes—in lieu of the original Female dummy—the predicted
value of Female obtained from the first‐step logistic estimation.11
Starting from Table 6, where we employ the first of our dependent variables, we observe that,
even after correcting for endogeneity, Female has a significant positive effect on the probability
of the various non‐application reasons. To rule out the possibility that the inclusion of country
and time dummies generates collinearity with the macro and structural controls (as utilized in
9We find analogous results (not reported for the sake of brevity_ when we interact Female with variables accounting for improvements in firms’ credit history
(Creditworthiness up) and capital (Capital up).
10Note that, to avoid collinearity with the (sector‐invariant) instrument, we omit the dummies accounting for sector of activity.
11Unreported tests highlight that our results are robust to using bootstrapped standard errors.
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TABLE 5 Two‐step multinomial logistic analysis (first step): impact of the share of female employment (by
sector of activity) on the Female dummy
This table reports regression results of the first stage of the two‐step multinomial logistic model discussed in
Section 3.3, concerning the impact of the share of female employment (by sector of activity) on the Female
dummy. The dependent variable is a variable equal to 1 if the firm's owner/director/CEO is female, and 0
otherwise. Female employment is a variable accounting for the share of female employment, by sector of activity.
Credit growth is the annual growth rate of loans provided by credit institutions to nonfinancial corporations
based on averages of quarterly data for each survey round. Economic freedom is an aggregate measure of a
country's overall economic freedom. Unemployment rate is the annual unemployment rate based on averages of
quarterly data for each survey round. Concentration is the Herfindahl index of total assets concentration (for the
banking sector). OMT is a dummy variable equal to 1 from the year of announcement (2012) of the Outright
Monetary Transactions program. Profit up is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm experienced an increase in net
income after taxes in the past 6 months. Profit down is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm experienced a
decrease in net income after taxes in the past 6 months. Creditworthiness up is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
firm's credit history improved in the past 6 months. Creditworthiness down is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
firm's credit history worsened in the past 6 months. Capital up is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm's own
capital increased in the past 6 months. Capital down is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm's own capital
decreased in the past 6 months. Demand up is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm's need for bank loans
increased in the past 6 months. Demand down is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm's need for bank loans
decreased in the past 6 months. Micro is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has between 1 and 9 employees.
Small is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has between 10 and 49 employees. Very recent is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the firm is less than 2 years old. Recent is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is between
2 and 5 years old. Old is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is between 5 and 10 years old. The regression
uses sampling weights that adjust the sample to be representative of the population. Additionally, the regression
includes time and country dummies. The intercept is included but not reported. Heteroskedasticity‐robust
standard errors, clustered at the country level, appear in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level,
** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
Female
Female Employment 1.195***
(0.19)
Credit growth 0.015**
(0.01)
Economic freedom 0.005
(0.00)
Unemployment rate 0.001
(0.00)
Concentration −1.450***
(0.54)
OMT 0.086*
(0.05)
Profit up −0.032
(0.03)
Profit down −0.006
(0.04)
Creditworthiness up 0.006
(0.02)
Creditworthiness down −0.037
(0.04)
(Continues)
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the first four columns of Table 6), we re‐estimate our model, first excluding time dummies only,
then omitting both time and country dummies. Results (not reported for the sake of brevity)
confirm our previous findings. In addition, our evidence further improves when we drop the
country‐level controls and include country × time dummies in columns 5–8. Overall, this result
underscores that our earlier findings are corroborated even after addressing the endogeneity
concern.
We now repeat the same procedure for the second of our dependent variables, namely
Obtaining bank loans. Results are displayed in Table 7 where we find that Female is never
statistically significant across the various specifications, confirming that women do not appear
to be treated differently than men.
To corroborate our findings, we then use the alternative variable (as described in Section 3.3)
to instrument our Female dummy. Namely, we utilize the share of female self‐employment by
sector of activity. Overall, unreported tests show that our two‐step multinomial logistic results
still hold when we employ this alternative instrument.
4.4 | Additional analysis: the impact of the economic cycle
In this section we exploit the macroeconomic heterogeneity characterizing our set of data.
Notably, we aim to investigate whether variations in the macroeconomic conditions over time
exert a different impact on both the self‐restraint behavior of women‐led firms as well as on the
TABLE 5 (Continued)
Female
Capital up −0.292***
(0.03)
Capital down 0.035
(0.02)
Demand up −0.109***
(0.03)
Demand down −0.158*
(0.09)
Micro 0.856***
(0.10)
Small 0.355***
(0.03)
Very recent 0.410***
(0.05)
Recent 0.344***
(0.07)
Old 0.106
(0.08)
Observations 55,679
Pseudo R‐squared 0.035
Time dummies Yes
Country dummies Yes
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outcomes of their bank loan applications. The underlying hypothesis is that, for instance,
during recessions all SMEs will be more likely to deal with an impaired credit market (and,
hence, worse access conditions) than in the upside phase of the cycle (Cole & Sokolyk, 2016;
Degryse et al., 2018).
Because our time‐span is not long enough to detect a complete business cycle, we split our
data set into two distinct sub‐samples: one gathering all the observations related to firms whose
country (in a given wave) faced negative GDP growth, and the other collating the observations
related to firms whose economy (in a given wave) experienced null or positive GDP growth.12
We therefore re‐estimate model (1) for both our dependent variables, in both sub‐samples.
Results are reported in Tables 8 and 9.
Some interesting findings arise from this analysis. Specifically, in Table 8—where we employ
Applying for bank loans as the dependent variable—we observe that female‐led SMEs are
discouraged during both phases of the economic cycle, as testified by Female being positive and
significant in the case of non‐application for fear of rejection (see Panels A and B of Table 8 for
regression results in the two sub‐samples). Additionally, as reported at the bottom of Table 8,
the Wald test highlights that the coefficients of Female in columns 2 and 6 are not statistically
different between the two panels, suggesting that female‐led firms do not appear to behave
differently during opposite phases of the business cycle. Interestingly, from this analysis we
observe that, even when the macroeconomic scenario appears to be favorable to the success of
enterprises, women do not seem to feel confident in their capabilities and, anticipating
rejection, do not even bother to submit a loan application. Furthermore, from Table 8 we learn
that female‐led SMEs are more likely than male‐led ones to refrain from applying for loans—
because they have sufficient funds or for other reasons—only during the economic downturns.
This evidence could be interpreted by policy‐makers as good news. Indeed, it might reveal that
female‐led companies are less susceptible to financial distress during turbulent times, as they
are more likely than men to be able to rely on an internal cushion of funds.
When we turn to the supply side, unexpected differences between opposite phases of the
business cycle emerge (see Panels A and B of Table 9 for regression results in the two sub‐
samples). We observe that during periods of negative economic growth, female‐led firms appear
to be less likely to reject credit when the price conditions are too high (see columns 3 and 7 of
Panel A in Table 9).13 This is because women‐led businesses might feel that bank credit is the
only available funding, given the economic downturn. Therefore, by accepting worse conditions,
they are basically carrying a much larger burden than their male peers. This excessive burden
might then translate into additional levels of stress and consequent decreasing rates of success
than would otherwise be the case. This partially explains why female‐led SMEs are more likely
to refrain from applying for loans. Moving on to Panel B of Table 9, we observe that during the
upside of the business cycle female‐led enterprises face a greater likelihood of seeing their loan
applications rejected by the lender than male‐led enterprises. More specifically, unreported
marginal effects (computed on regressions outputs from columns 4 and 8 of Panel B in Table 9)
show that the probability of women receiving a loan rejection during a period of positive GDP
growth is 2.2% higher than for men. Moreover, the Wald test reported at the bottom of the table
12It is worth clarifying that this is not a geographical split grouping, say, six countries in one bucket and the remaining five in the other. Rather, via this sample
split, the same country can be present in both sub‐samples. Indeed, the split is based on the growth of GDP (either negative or null/positive), which can vary
wave by wave within the same country.
13We are conscious that the Female coefficients in columns 3 and 7 of Panels A and B in Table 9 are only mildly statistically different, their Wald test p‐values
both being a little in excess of 10% (see the bottom of the table).
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underscores that the Female coefficients in Panels A and B of Table 9 are statistically different.
Our results document that during times of crisis lenders might be less willing to provide credit
in general, thus not particularly discriminating against women. In contrast, when the economy
is in a positive phase, banks seem to favor male‐led enterprises. The absence of gender bias in
the full sample might thus reflect a counterbalancing effect of the opposite results we detect in
the two sub‐samples.
5 | CONCLUSIONS
Bank credit is a pivotal financing tool for SMEs. A rich literature investigates the existence of
possible differences in the behavior of firms and lenders when the former try to access bank
loans. However, the empirical evidence on these issues is far from conclusive and supposedly
driven by the different country settings investigated.
In this paper we focus on a large sample of European SMEs and apply an efficient
methodology in order to detect potential differences between male‐ and female‐led companies
with regard to the propensity to use bank credit as well as the outcome of their loan
applications. Specifically, using multinomial logistic models, on the demand side we investigate
the existence of gender differences in the behavior of enterprises by testing whether female‐led
businesses are more likely than men not to apply for loans (i.e. for fear of rejection, due to
sufficient internal funds, or for other reasons), with respect to the base outcome (i.e. Applied).
On the supply side we test whether female‐led firms are more credit‐constrained by lenders
than are their male peers. Then we address possible endogeneity affecting our estimates by
employing a two‐stage technique. Finally, we exploit the macroeconomic heterogeneity
characterizing our sample to detect any possible difference in the behavior of firms and banks
during different phases of the business cycle.
Our findings suggest that female‐led firms have a greater propensity to refrain from credit
applications than men. This evidence turns out to be stable, for the whole sample, over different
model specifications, and is confirmed even after addressing our endogeneity concerns.
Additionally, female discouragement persists in both phases of the business cycle, whereas non‐
applications by female‐led SMEs due to sufficient funds and for other reasons mainly occur
during economic downturns. On the supply side, we interestingly observe that signs of gender
bias on the part of lenders only arise when the economy is performing well, but not from the
whole sample. Finally, our results highlight that, during economic downturns, female‐led
businesses are less likely than male‐led ones to refuse a loan offer even if it is too costly.
Overall, our analysis reveals in particular that the inclination of women not to apply for bank
loans due to sufficient funds is not a completely negative outcome. Indeed, our further tests
highlight that this behavior most likely arises during economic downturns, which may signal
that female‐led businesses are less susceptible to stress, given that they do not need to rely on
external providers of finance.
In addition, our investigation highlights the prevalence of self‐restraint behavior by female‐
led firms, rather than a consistent attitude of lenders denying credit. This evidence is crucial
from a policy perspective. Indeed, borrower discouragement implies forgone investment
opportunities for firms and lost selling opportunities for banks (Freel et al., 2012).
Therefore policy‐making bodies (such as the European Institute of Gender Equality) might
endeavor to design and suggest policies aimed at addressing the self‐restraint attitude of
women‐led businesses by, for instance, helping female managers to gain confidence in the
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bank‐credit market, thus encouraging the use of external sources of finance. More generally,
such policies should also aim to help women leaders to acquire more confidence in their ability
to run the business. Addressing these issues is also fundamental because such demand‐driven
behaviors produce suboptimal allocation of resources, growth constraints, and loss of
employment opportunities.
Differently from other survey‐based contributions in the literature, our study, given its large
and comprehensive sample of female‐ and male‐owned companies across a large set of
countries, has the advantage of being more representative of SMEs operating in different areas
of the European continent. However, we also acknowledge a major limitation of our analysis
which does not control for the education and skills of firm CEOs/managers/owners. Using such
information, if available, would allow us to gain more knowledge about the importance of other
personal traits in relation to the attitude toward the use of external finance. Future research is
needed in this direction.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1 Variable descriptions and sources
This table reports descriptions and sources of the variables employed in our analyses.
Variables Description Source
Dependent variables
Applying for bank loans Variable equal to 1, 2, 3, or 4 if a firm applied, did not
apply because of possible rejection, did not apply
because of sufficient internal funds, or did not apply
for other reasons during the past 6 months,
respectively
ECB‐EC: SAFE
Obtaining bank loans Variable equal to 1, 2, 3, or 4 if a firm applied and got
everything, applied but only got part of the loan,
applied but refused because the cost was too high, or
applied but was rejected during the past 6 months,
respectively
ECB‐EC: SAFE
Key regressor
Female Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's owner/
director/CEO is female, and 0 otherwise
ECB‐EC: SAFE
Firm‐level controls
Profit up Dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm experienced an
increase in net income after taxes in the past 6
months
ECB‐EC: SAFE
Profit down Dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm experienced a
decrease in net income after taxes in the past 6
months
ECB‐EC: SAFE
Creditworthiness up Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's credit history
improved in the past 6 months
ECB‐EC: SAFE
Creditworthiness down Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's credit history
worsened in the past 6 months
ECB‐EC: SAFE
Capital up Dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm's own capital
increased in the past 6 months
ECB‐EC: SAFE
Capital down Dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm's own capital
decreased in the past 6 months
ECB‐EC: SAFE
Demand up Dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm's need for bank
loans increased in the past 6 months
ECB‐EC: SAFE
(Continues)
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TABLE A1 (Continued)
Variables Description Source
Demand down Dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm's need for bank
loans decreased in the past 6 months
ECB‐EC: SAFE
Micro Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has between 1
and 9 employees
ECB‐EC: SAFE
Small Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has between 10
and 49 employees
ECB‐EC: SAFE
Medium Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has between 50
and 249 employees
ECB‐EC: SAFE
Very recent Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is less than 2
years old
ECB‐EC: SAFE
Recent Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is between 2
and 5 years old
ECB‐EC: SAFE
Old Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is between 5
and 10 years old
ECB‐EC: SAFE
Construction Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's main activity
is construction
ECB‐EC: SAFE
Manufacturing Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's main activity
is manufacturing
ECB‐EC: SAFE
Wholesale/retail Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's main activity
is wholesale or retail trade
ECB‐EC: SAFE
Country‐level controls
Credit growth The annual growth rate of loans provided by credit
institutions to nonfinancial corporations based on
averages of quarterly data for each survey round
ECB: Data
Warehouse
Economic freedom An aggregate measure of a country's overall economic
freedom
Heritage
Foundation
Unemployment rate The annual unemployment rate based on averages of
quarterly data for each survey round
Eurostat
Concentration The Herfindahl index of total assets concentration (for
the banking sector)
ECB: Data
Warehouse
OMT Dummy variable equal to 1 from the year of
announcement (2012) of the Outright Monetary
Transactions program
Authors’
calculation
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